Google is adding Marvell as a third chip designer alongside Broadcom and MediaTek in its TPU program, The Next Web reports. The stated reason is supply chain resilience. The actual story is who holds the power in the semiconductor industry.
For decades, the dynamic was simple: chip vendors built silicon, system companies bought it. The chip vendor decided what to optimize. The customer took it or left it. That relationship has inverted. The system companies — Google, Amazon, Meta, Microsoft — now define the architecture and contract multiple chip designers to execute against it. The chip vendor is the foundry service. The system company is the architect.
Google's expansion of its TPU program illustrates the structure. Broadcom builds the high-performance variants. MediaTek handles cost-optimized silicon. Marvell handles auxiliary processing. TSMC manufactures all of it. Google's own engineers wrote the specification. Three companies do the engineering; one company owns the roadmap.
The same pattern runs through every major hyperscaler. Amazon is ramping Trainium 3 for production in the second quarter of 2026, Oplexa writes. Meta extended its custom silicon partnership with Broadcom into a multi-generation agreement. OpenAI is building its own silicon on the same model. None of these programs started because the chip industry offered the right product. They started because general-purpose silicon did not fit, and the companies had the engineering scale to fund an alternative.
The numbers behind this shift are substantial. Broadcom reported $8.4 billion in AI semiconductor revenue for the first quarter of fiscal 2026, up 106 percent year over year, Tech Insider reports. The company is targeting $100 billion in AI chip revenue for fiscal 2027, with 65 percent gross margins on AI chip sales. It serves six major custom AI chip customers under agreements structured through 2031. Custom ASIC sales are projected to grow 45 percent in 2026, reaching $118 billion by 2033, The Next Web writes. Marvell carries a $1.5 billion annual run rate across 18 cloud-provider design wins and reported $6.1 billion in data center revenue last year, up 42 percent.
These numbers represent a reallocation of where value collects in the semiconductor supply chain. The chip vendor once sold the unit. The system company now buys the architecture, and multiple vendors compete to fulfill it.
The cost structure of modern chip design has made this shift durable for the largest players. Advanced multi-die systems shift the dominant cost from silicon re-spins, redesigning the chip itself, to advanced packaging, testing complexity, and manufacturing readiness, EE Times writes. These are integration problems. They belong to whoever controls the system architecture, not the logic designer working in isolation. Whoever controls the packaging controls the cost curve.
Nvidia's own product choices confirm the dynamic. The company's Dynamo framework, now running in production, splits LLM inference into two stages and routes each to different silicon optimized for its specific bottleneck: compute-intensive prompt processing goes to one die, and memory-intensive token generation goes to another, Nvidia's Developer Blog explains. The GB300 NVL72 system showed a 2.77-times performance improvement over its predecessor in the DeepSeek-R1 server benchmark within six months, The Next Platform reports. Nvidia combined Groq's LP30 architecture, 500 megabytes of on-chip SRAM for latency-sensitive operations, with GPU compute for memory-heavy attention stages, SemiAnalysis reports. The underlying reason: treating both inference stages on the same chip is inefficient in a way that matters at hyperscaler scale.
But Nvidia's move illustrates the same inversion. The architecture decisions are being made by the people running the workloads. Groq's LP30 is in Nvidia's stack because Groq built something useful for a specific bottleneck. Broadcom's TPU program is in Google's data centers because Google designed the architecture. The hyperscalers are the architects. The chip vendors are the foundry service.
The two-track market this creates is becoming permanent. On one track, Nvidia continues to dominate with general-purpose GPUs serving thousands of customers who lack the scale or engineering depth to design their own silicon. On the other track, the six or seven largest hyperscalers are building custom ASIC programs that insulate them from GPU pricing cycles, give them control over supply, and let them optimize silicon for their specific software stack. The gap between these tracks is widening.
What Google did with Marvell, adding a third chip partner to own the architecture rather than cede it to any single vendor, is the template. The chip vendors are now competing for the system company's business. The system company writes the spec.