The Pentagon awarded Raytheon RTX a $45.3 million contract modification for GPS ground operations support on March 31, the same day the company's prior contract option expired, according to SpaceNews. The modification is an unpriced change order, meaning work proceeds before anyone agrees on what it costs. That is the entire program in miniature.
RTX delivered the Operational Control System, known as OCX, to the U.S. Space Force in July 2025. Nine months later, the ground segment that is supposed to operate the GPS constellation remains nonoperational, Ars Technica reported. The company has since been paid to keep supporting a system that does not yet work.
The numbers behind OCX are not complicated. The program was supposed to cost $3.7 billion and finish in 2016. It has now consumed approximately $8 billion over 16 years, triggered a Nunn-McCurdy breach in 2016 for cost overruns exceeding 25 percent, and accumulated more than 270 open deficiencies across site acceptance, developmental, and simulator testing as of December 2024, according to data compiled by defense analyst Spender AED Systems. The Government Accountability Office found OCX was marred by poor acquisition decisions and a slow recognition of development problems before it exceeded cost and schedule targets.
The technical picture is worse. OCX Block 0 was delivered in November 2017, more than a year late, and can only support launch and checkout of GPS satellites. It cannot operate them, according to Air and Space Forces Magazine. The current operational OCX capability, Block 1, was supposed to fix that. It has not. Thomas Ainsworth, the program executive officer for space systems, told the Senate Armed Services Committee in March that expanded testing with actual GPS satellites, ground antennas, and user equipment led to an increase in findings, revealing extensive system issues across all subsystems, many of which have not been resolved.
"The program is essentially too big to fail, so it doesn't matter how often it does," said Alison Brown, president of NAVSYS, a GPS navigation systems company. That assessment has not aged poorly.
OCX was designed to bring M-code, the military encrypted and jam-resistant GPS signal, to approximately 700 warfighter platforms. M-code has been technically available for years: the first M-code-capable satellite launched in 2005, and 24 of the 31 satellites in the current GPS constellation can transmit it as of May 2024, according to National Defense Magazine. The satellites can do their job. The ground system that is supposed to command and control them cannot. As of this month, M-code remains undelivered for operational use, according to SOFX.
The stakes are not abstract. GPS jamming and spoofing intensified across the Persian Gulf following U.S. and Israeli strikes against Iran on February 28, degrading navigation for military and civilian users in the region, SOFX reported. The system that was supposed to protect against exactly this scenario has been in development since before many of the service members currently deployed were born.
The next piece of the program is not close. OCX 3F, the upgrade required to support the next-generation GPS IIIF satellites, is not expected to be ready until fiscal 2027 at the earliest, with operational acceptance slipping to 2028, according to Air and Space Forces Magazine. The first GPS IIIF satellite has already slipped from a projected April 2026 launch to November 2026, partly due to technical issues with the satellite's mission data unit, Spender AED Systems noted.
In early 2024, Space Systems Command placed a contractor on its high-priority Contractor Responsibility Watch List for a program contributing to a critical space capability, confirmed by SSC commander Lt. Gen. Philip Garrant. Industry analysts have identified RTX as the relevant contractor. The watch list designation means the program is in enough trouble that someone in uniform is watching the company's performance personally.
Ainsworth put it plainly in March testimony. He was asked about where the blame lies. His answer covered three areas: problems in program management, problems with contractor performance, and problems in system engineering. On both sides, Air and Space Forces Magazine reported.
The $45.3 million modification buys time. It does not buy capability. The contract option that expired March 31 is not expected to be extended in full, according to SpaceNews. What replaces it is under active reassessment. The program may be terminated. RTX has burned 16 years and $8 billion to deliver a ground system that the Pentagon is now considering canceling. At some point, the phrase "lessons learned" needs to describe something that was actually learned.